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Including Non-Speculative Future
Value in Delaware Appraisal Proceedings:
Why the Chancery Court in Allenson Got It Wrong
Ryan W Koppelman*
I. INTRODUCTION
When two corporations merge the majority shareholders often pre-
fer to "cash-out" the minority shareholders in the transaction.1 The
minority shareholders receive cash in return for their shares and lose
their stake in the company.2 Majority shareholders often negotiate a
merger through their control of management and easily vote to ap-
prove the merger to the detriment of the dissenting minority share-
holder votes.3 If the minority shareholders do not have the voting
power to block the merger, they are vulnerable to the opportunistic
acts of the majority shareholders. 4
In the absence of any fraud, overreaching, or illegality, a cashed-out
shareholder's only remedy under Delaware law is judicial appraisal of
that shareholder's shares.5 An appraisal action seeks to determine the
fair price or fair value of the shares.6 A controversial aspect of this
process is the inclusion of the merged corporation's future value. The
controversy mainly stems from two Delaware Supreme Court deci-
sions, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.7 and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 8
* Mr. Koppelman is an associate at Brown Robert LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. He re-
ceived his J.D. from the University of Georgia School of Law and his B.A. from Saint Joseph's
College in Indiana.
1. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 705-08 (Del. 1983) (involving the cash out




5. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001) (recognizing the
Delaware rule).
6. See id.
7. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 701 (Del. 1983).
8. 684 A.2d 289 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996). This case is often referred to as "Cede IV" because it
was the fourth appeal. This article refers to it simply as "Cede" because it will not discuss the
previous appeals. Only the fourth appeal and the lower court's opinion that it overturned will be
discussed. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch. 1990).
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These two cases expanded the ability of Delaware courts to include
the future value of a merged firm in appraisals. 9
In Weinberger, The Signal Companies, Inc. acquired 50.5% of UOP,
Inc. via a tender offer.10 A couple of years later, Signal and UOP ne-
gotiated a merger plan which cashed-out UOP's minority interest. The
boards of directors of both companies and the majority shareholders
of UOP approved the merger plan." The cashed-out shareholders of
UOP sued for appraisal of their shares. Weinberger repudiated use of
the business judgment rule in determining the fairness of a cash-out
merger and instead adopted the "entire fairness" test.12 Also accord-
ing to Weinberger, fair price is one inquiry in determining the entire
fairness of a merger.13 The court analyzed the role of future value in
determining fair price. 14 It interpreted the statutory language of 8 Del.
C. § 262(h), which states that the chancery court must determine, "fair
value exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplish-
ment or expectation of the merger or consolidation.' 1 5 The court in
Weinberger limited this exclusion to only the speculative elements of
value arising from a merger. 16 It stated:
Only the speculative elements of value that may arise from the "ac-
complishment or expectation" of the merger are excluded. We take
this to be a very narrow exception to the appraisal process, designed
to eliminate use of pro forma data and projections of a speculative
variety relating to the completion of a merger. But elements of fu-
ture value, including the nature of the enterprise, which are known
or susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and not the
product of speculation, may be considered. 17
The Weinberger interpretation of Section 262(h) is the core of this arti-
cle's argument.
9. See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1142-43 (Del. 1989) (acknowledging that
Weinberger liberalized the standard for determining the "fair value" of the company's outstand-
ing shares).
10. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 704.
11. Id. at 705-06.
12. See id. at 712-13.
13. Id. at 711.
14. Id. at 713-14.
15. 8 Del. Ch. § 262(h). The Court of Chancery is a unique institution with a long history. It is
a trial-level court that sits in equity and primarily handles corporate matters in Delaware, which
it has unparalleled experience in doing. Its decisions are appealed directly to the Delaware Su-
preme Court. See generally William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the
Delaware Court of Chancery-1792-1992, in Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware-1792-
1992, a publication of the Bicentennial Commemoration Committee of the Historical Society for
the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, available at http://courts.state.de.us/Courts/
Court %20of%20Chancery/?history.htm.
16. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713..
17. Id.
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In Cede, MacAndrews & Forbes Group, Inc. ("MAF"), a company
controlled by Ron Perelman, acquired Technicolor, Inc. via a "two-
step merger," i.e. a planned merger utilizing an initial tender offer fol-
lowed by a short-form merger.18 After MAF took control of Techni-
color via the tender offer, but before it initiated a short-form merger,
Ron Perelman initiated his plan to break up Technicolor by selling it
off in pieces. 19 The chancery court held that the Perelman plan could
be considered during appraisal, because the steps required to imple-
ment the plan changed the "nature of the enterprise" and became the
"operative reality" of the organization.20 The Delaware Supreme
Court in Cede overruled the chancery court decision 2' and applied the
Weinberger interpretation of Section 262(h) to the actions of the ma-
jority acquiror in the interim between the first and second steps of the
merger.22
Since the Delaware Supreme Court decision in Cede, the chancery
court has issued three opinions dealing with the issue of future value.
Grimes v. Vitalink, Inc.23 involved a two-step merger between two
technology companies.24 In ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, Inc.25 a major-
ity acquiror cashed out a 40% interest in several cancer treatment cen-
ters as the first part of a sequence of mergers. 26 Allenson v. Midway
Airlines, Inc.27 pertained to a one-step merger that was negotiated in
lieu of a bankruptcy. 28
The chancery court in Allenson held that Cede did not apply to a
one-step merger.29 The court reached its conclusion because it was
more persuaded by its own conception of economic fairness than the
law as set forth in Weinberger.30 This article argues that Allenson was
not properly decided in light of Weinberger and Cede.3' The non-spec-
ulative future value of a merged firm should be included in the ap-
praisal regardless of whether the merger utilized a one or two-step
18. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 291-93 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996).
19. Id. at 293.
20. Id.
21. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch. 1990).
22. Cede, 684 A.2d at 298-99.
23. 1997 WL 538676 (Del. Ch. 1997), aftfd, 708 A.2d 630 (Del. 1998) (commenting merely that
the chancery court's opinion was well reasoned).
24. Id. at *1.
25. 751 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 1999).
26. Id. at 907.
27. 789 A.2d 572 (Del. Ch. 2001).
28. Id. at 577-78.
29. See id. at 584-86.
30. Id. at 585-86.
31. See infra notes 103-120 and accompanying text.
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process. In support, this article first briefly discusses the Grimes and
ONTI decisions. 32 An examination of the chancery court's reasoning
in Cede and the Delaware Supreme Court's rejection of it follows. 33
Finally, Allenson is analyzed and critiqued.34
II. Grimes v. Vitalink
In Grimes, NSC, Inc. acquired Vitalink, Inc. via a tender offer and
short-form merger. 35 Vitalink was in the business of making "wide-
area bridges," which network computers together.36 It sought to mod-
ernize its business by selling routers, a new and more-advanced tech-
nology that was competing with bridges. 37 In furtherance of this goal,
Vitalink had been pursuing two strategies.38 First, it had been trying to
internally develop its own routers.39 Second, it had been trying to se-
cure an OEM contract with another manufacturer to sell that com-
pany's routers under the strong Vitalink brand name. 40 At the time of
the merger, however, Vitalink had not yet developed a viable router
nor had it secured an OEM contract. 41
Before the merger, Vitalink made several sales forecasts for the sale
of routers.42 It wanted to include those forecasts in the appraisal value
of the company. 43 It argued that this maneuver was acceptable under
Cede.44 The chancery court disagreed and held that the sales forecasts
where too speculative to be included. 45 It distinguished Cede because
in Cede the company owned the assets that Perelman was trying to
sell, but here Vitalink had yet to gain access to the products it was
trying to sell, rendering any future sales speculative. 46
32. See infra notes 37-68 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 82-115 and accompanying text.
35. Grimes v. Vitalink, Inc., 1997 WL 538676, at *1 (Del. Ch. 1997).
36. See id. at *3.
37. Id. at *4.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at *4.
41. Grimes v. Vitalink, 1997 WL 538676 (Del. Ch. 1997).
42. Id. at *5.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *6.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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III. ONTI v. Integra Bank
The cashed-out shareholders in ONTI originally owned a 40% in-
terest in OTI, Inc.47 Douglas Colkitt owned the other 60%.48 On Au-
gust 30, 1995, OTI performed a cash-out merger with "The Eight
Treatment Centers" 49 that it owned, extinguishing the plaintiff's 40%
interest.50 Two entities survived the merger, ONTI, Inc. and "The New
Treatment Companies."' 51 The cashed-out shareholders sought ap-
praisal on the basis of this merger.52
Immediately after the first merger, The New Treatment Companies
merged with COG, Inc., a company entirely owned by Colkitt.5 3 Then,
on September 6, 1995, just seven days after the first merger, COG
announced a merger with EquiVision, a public company of which
Colkitt owned 30%. 54 That merger was completed on Februrary 5,
1996.55 Colkitt was planning the execution of both of these two subse-
quent mergers well before the first merger between OTI and The
Eight Treatment Centers.56
In order to calculate the fair price of their shares, the cashed-out
shareholders' valuation expert considered the subsequent mergers. In
his calculation he used the EquiVision market stock price. The day
after the COG merger announcement, the stock price was $14.25 per
share, and the day the merger was completed it was $15.50 per share.5 7
The expert used the more conservative value, $14.25, and multiplied it
by the number of shares of the merged firm that COG shareholders
received in the EquiVision merger.5 8 He multiplied that product by
31.7%, The Eight Treatment Centers' worth in relationship to COG,
its former parent company.5 9 The expert multiplied that product by
40%, the cashed-out shareholders stake in The Eight Treatment Cen-
47. ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bankr, 751 A.2d 904, 907 (Del. Ch. 1999).
48. Id. at 906.
49. The court used the terms "The Eight Treatment Centers" and "The New Treatment Com-
panies" as shorthand references for two groups of companies, which, for practical purposes, it
treated as singular companies.
50. ONTI, 751 A.2d at 907.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 907.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 907-08.
55. Id. at 908.
56. ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 910 (Del. Ch. 1999).
57. Id. at 908.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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ters.60 The result was an estimated appraisal value of $93 million for
their shares versus the $6 million that they were originally allotted.61
The court allowed this valuation method to be considered, holding
that the Equivision merger could be used in determining the fair price
in light of Cede.62 The court found that the Delaware Supreme Court's
statement in Cavalier Oil that, "[A corporation must be valued] as an
operating entity by application of traditional value factors, weighted
as required, but without regard to post-merger events or other possi-
ble business combinations, '63 must be considered in light of Cede,
which requires "consideration of 'all elements of future value, includ-
ing the nature of the enterprise, which are known or susceptible of
proof as of the date of the merger and not the product of specula-
tion."64 Since the EquiVision merger was effectively in place at the
time of the merger, the court found it was not a product of specula-
tion.65 Therefore, Cede requires allowance of the valuation method
chosen by the cashed-out shareholders' valuation expert. 66
IV. Cede Chancery Court Opinion
In Cede the chancery court held that the Perelman plan should not
be included in the fair price.67 It based its decision on the "majority
acquiror principle, '68 which holds that dissenting shareholders are
only entitled to the value of the going concern "unaffected by the
plans or strategies of the acquiror. ' '69 To be consistent with this princi-
ple, the court proposed that the Weinberger holding be read with the
insertion of an assumed phrase.70 The revised holding would read:
"But elements of future value, including the nature of the enterprise,
which are known or susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger
and not the product of speculation, may be considered [unless, but for
the merger, such elements of future value would not exist]." 7' The
60. Id. at 908.
61. Id. at 907-08.
62. ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 911 (Del. Ch. 1999).
63. Id. at 909-10 (citing Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989)).
64. Id., 751 A.2d at 910 (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 684 A.2d 289, 300 (Del. Super. Ct.
1996)).
65. ONTI, 751 A.2d at 910.
66. Id. at 910.
67. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084 at *20 (Del. Ch. 1990).
68. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 295-96 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (referring to
the Chancery Court's principle as the "majority acquiror principle").
69. Cede, 1990 WL 161084 at *20.
70. Id. at *19.
71. Cede, 684 A.2d at 295-96 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del.
1983)); Cede, 1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch. 1990)).
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Delaware Supreme Court referred to this inserted phrase as the
"proximate cause exception. '72
In Cede the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the lower court's
reasoning, but it qualified the rejection with the phrase "for two-step
mergers. ' 73 It stated: "[t]he majority acquiror principle and correla-
tive proximate cause exception for two-step mergers, upon which the
Court of Chancery premised its holding, are inconsistent with this
Court's interpretation of the appraisal statute in Weinberger.'' 74 This
qualification was also present in the opinion where the court stated its
main holding: "In a two-step merger, to the extent that value has been
added following a change in majority control before cash-out, it is still
value attributable to the going concern . . . on the date of the
merger. '75 Even'though this qualification limits the Cede holding to
two-step mergers, it does not mean that the court in Cede was at-
tempting to limit the Weinberger holding to only two-step mergers sit-
uations. If this were the court's intent, such a limitation would support
the outcome in Allenson, in which non-speculative future value result-
ing from a one-step merger was not included in the appraisal value
because it was a one-step merger. The proper interpretation of the
"two-step merger" qualification in Cede is important to the thesis of
this article.
The Cede court did not limit the Weinberger holding to two-step
mergers for at least two reasons. First, it is a stretch to say that the
acquiror in Weinberger used a true two-step merger. While Weinberger
involved a tender offer and a subsequent cash-out merger, the merger
agreement was negotiated after the tender offer.76 The tender offer
was not part of the merger agreement.77 The original tender offer was
in 1975, and the second round of negotiations leading to the cash-out
did not begin until 1977.78 Thus, since Weinberger did not involve a
two-step merger, the Weinberger language did not contain a two-step
merger limitation and it would therefore be illogical for the court in
Cede to insert such a limitation in Weinberger.
Second, and most importantly, the proximate cause exception advo-
cated by the chancery court in Cede is logically inconsistent with the
Weinberger language. When the Delaware Supreme Court included
the qualification "for two-step mergers" in its rejection of the proxi-
72. Cede, 684 A.2d. at 296.
73. Id.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
76. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 704 (Del. 1983).
77. Id. at 704-05.
78. Id.
348 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
mate cause exception, it could not have been reserving the applicabil-
ity of the exception to one-step mergers because of this inherent
inconsistency. It is evident by inserting the proximate cause exception
into the Weinberger opinion two sentences before the place the chan-
cery court in Cede inserted it. Doing so renders Weinberger as saying:
"Only the speculative elements of value that may arise from the 'ac-
complishment or expectation' of the merger are excluded [unless, but
for the merger, such elements of future value would not exist.]"' 79 The
phrases "arising from the accomplishment of the merger" and "but for
the merger" both apparently refer to the merger causing the value.
The original Weinberger language says that non-speculative elements
caused by the merger should be included; whereas the proximate
cause exception says that all elements of value caused by the merger
should be excluded. These statements are inconsistent. Therefore, the
Supreme Court could not have been reserving the applicability of the
proximate cause exception for one-step mergers. The proximate cause
exception is fundamentally inconsistent with Weinberger for both one
and two-step mergers alike.
V. Allenson v. Midway Airlines
In Allenson, Midway Airlines, Inc. was having severe financial diffi-
culty and needed an infusion of new capital to avoid filing bank-
ruptcy.80 An unrelated investor agreed to invest that capital on two
conditions: 1) Midway's creditors agreed to certain cost concessions
and 2) Midway's majority stockholder agreed to invest new capital
himself.81 The majority stockholder, creditors, and outside investor
reached an agreement satisfying these conditions.82 The agreement
planned for a merger of Midway into a new entity of which the outside
investor would own 67% and the former majority stockholder would
own 22%.83 The public shareholders were to be cashed-out for $0.01
per share. 84 The agreement for cost concessions was in place before
the date of the merger, but the cost concessions were contingent upon
the merger.85 The cashed-out shareholders sued for appraisal of their
shares, claiming that the concessions should be included in the fair
price of their shares.86
79. Id. at 713; Cede, 1990 WL 161084, at *19.
80. Allenson v. Midway Airlines Corp., 789 A.2d 572, 577 (Del. Ch. 2001).
81. Id. at 576-77.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 573.
84. Id. at 579.
85. Id. at 578.
86. Allenson v. Midway Airlines Corp., 789 A.2d 572, 573 (Del. Ch. 2001).
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The Allenson court held that the concessions should not be included
in the fair price of the cashed-out shares.87 It reasoned that the value
resulting from the creditors concessions even though non-speculative,
did not add value before the completion of the merger, and thus could
not be included in the fair value under Cede.88 Value was not, and
indeed could not be added before the merger, because Midway
neither had the unilateral power to effect the concessions nor exer-
cised any such power, given the contingent nature of the cost conces-
sions.89 According to the court, both powers are required under Cede
in order to add value.90
The Allenson court held that the issue of unilateral power was
merely a factual distinction between the Allenson facts and the facts of
Cede.91 The factual distinction supposedly could not be raised to the
level of legal doctrine.92 The legal doctrine according to the Allenson
court is the supposed "value added" test from Cede.93 But, this initial
reasoning seems a bit disingenuous given how the Allenson court pro-
ceeded with its reasoning. It examined value added only in terms of
whether Midway had the unilateral power to effect the concessions. 94
Midway did not have this power pre-merger, and that was essentially
the end of the Court's added value analysis. 95 So, the effect was that
this "mere factual distinction" was raised to the level of a legal doc-
trine after all. It was in effect the whole test, albeit under the guise of
"value added."
VI. ANALYSIS
The reasoning in Allenson has three specific problems, which to-
gether indicate the case was wrongly decided. First, the Allenson
court did not apply the Weinberger holding, but instead it seemed to
apply the proximate cause exception. Second, the court either misun-
derstood or misapplied the phrase "value added" in Cede. Finally, the
court failed to distinguish Cede as a "nature of the enterprise" case
and Allenson as not.
87. Id. at 584-86.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 584-86.
91. Allenson v. Midway Airlines Corp., 789 A.2d 572, 584 (Del. Ch. 2001).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 585.
95. Id. at 585.
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A. Application of the Proximate Cause Exception, Instead of the
Weinberger Interpretation
The Allenson reasoning looked suspiciously like an application of
the proximate cause exception that the Cede chancery court unsuc-
cessfully tried to create. The Allenson court argued that because the
cost concessions would not exist but for the merger, they should be
excluded from fair value. The underlying role of the proximate cause
exception in the court's holding is apparent by the court's own admis-
sion that it was heavily influenced by "considerations of economic
fairness." 96
The Allenson court argued that because the acquiror in Cede was
implementing the business plan at the time of the merger, it had sub-
jected the minority stockholders to the economic risks of the plan.97
Since they were subject to the plan's risks, they would be entitled to
its benefits. 98 On the facts in Allenson, the court observed that the
"minority shareholders bore none of the economic risk of the
[c]oncessions" 99 because of their agreed upon exit before the conces-
sions were effective. 100 The court concluded:
Unlike Cede IV, where the new value was contributed pre-merger
by the acquiror, here the new value was contributed post-merger by
both the acquiror and the former majority stockholder. In these cir-
cumstances, § 262(h) and Cede IV proscribe the inclusion of the
new value (the concessions) in determining the fair value of Midway
at the time of the merger101
This emphasis on pre-merger and post-merger value resembles an-
other incarnation of the proximate cause exception. The Allenson
court excluded post-merger value that would not have existed but for
the merger, for the same reasons the chancery court in Cede of-
fered:10 2 economic fairness. 10 3 This analysis and result are contrary to
Weinberger. The proximate cause exception, as discussed above, is in-
consistent with Weinberger.1 4
The court's disregard for Weinberger is clear by its invocation of
section 262(h) without discussing the Weinberger interpretation of it.
96. Allenson v. Midway Airlines Corp., 789 A.2d 572, 585-86 (Del. Ch. 2001).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 585.
100. Id. at 586.
101. Id. (emphasis in original).
102. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084 at *20 (Del. Ch. 1990).
103. Allenson v. Midway Airlines Corp., 789 A.2d 572, 586 (Del. Ch. 2001).
104. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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Taking Weinberger into account, the concessions were not proscribed
under Section 262(h) as Allenson contended. Weinberger said:
Only the speculative elements of value that may arise from the 'ac-
complishment or expectation' of the merger are excluded. [T]his [is]
a very narrow exception to the appraisal process, designed to elimi-
nate use of pro forma data and projections of a speculative variety
relating to the completion of a merger.10 5
In Allenson, the court admitted that the concessions were not specula-
tive.10 6 They were subject to an agreement. Furthermore, the conces-
sions arose from the accomplishment of the merger because the
concessions were made contingent on the merger by the agreement. 107
Therefore, the concessions were not proscribed under the Weinberger
interpretation of Section 262(h); they should have been included. 08
It was not for. the chancery court to decide whether the Weinberger
holding was economically undesirable. Such considerations should
only be relevant when there is not clear Supreme Court authority on
point. Here Weinberger was directly on point and dictated the oppo-
site outcome.
B. Allenson Misunderstood or Misapplied the "Value
Added" Concept
The Allenson court either misunderstood or misapplied the phrase
"value added" in Cede. The Cede court said:
In a two-step merger, to the extent that value has been added fol-
lowing a change in majority control before cash-out, it is still value
attributable to the going concern . . . on the date of the merger.
Consequently, value added to the going concern by the 'majority
acquiror,' during the transient period of a two-step merger, accrues
to the benefit of all shareholders and must be included in the ap-
praisal process on the date of the merger.10 9
It is more likely that the Cede court included the phrase "value ad-
ded" only to focus the chancery court on determining how much value
to attribute to a given element of future value, rather than as a test to
determine whether to consider future value as understood by the Al-
lenson court. In Cede the value added between the steps of the merger
is not the same as the value added at the time of Perelman's actual
sale of the assets months later. Standard valuation methods would re-
105. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
106. Allenson, 789 A.2d at n.17.
107. Id. at 581-82.
108. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 296 (Del. Super. 1996) (quoting Wein-
berger, 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) but adding the phrase "and should": "elements of future
value... not the product of speculation, may [and should] be considered.").
109. Id. at 298-99.
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quire that some type of discount be applied to determine the value of
those future transactions at the time of the merger. It is more likely
that the Cede court was merely focusing on this fact, rather than creat-
ing a whole new test.
As this article has argued, the appropriate rule is laid out in Wein-
berger: "[Non-speculative] elements of future value ...may [and
should be] considered."' 110 By shifting the focus to whether value was
added value before the merger, instead of whether the value was spec-
ulative, the Allenson court precluded any consideration of future
value arising from the merger. But, non-speculative value arising from
the completion of a merger was specifically included by Weinberger.
The two holdings are inconsistent.
However, even if, for the sake of argument, one accepts the Allen-
son concept of a value added test, the court has misapplied it. It is not
as obvious as Allenson suggests that the pre-merger concessions
agreement did not add value to Midway before the merger. For this to
be true one would have to accept that the concessions agreement was
of no value until it was either actually exercised or the contingent
event (the merger) occurred. By its ruling the court suggests that Mid-
way was not more valuable with the agreement than without it be-
cause it was contingent. It seems odd to assume that an agreement is
valueless before its execution merely because the agreement is
contingent.
The agreement at least should have added value to the majority
shareholder's interest. This is evident by merely inquiring whether the
majority interest in Midway would be more valuable with the agree-
ment than without it, even though it is contingent. The answer is, of
course it would be. The question of what dollar value should be attrib-
uted to the agreement is a separate question. If the agreement is being
valued at some point before the merger, it generally should be dis-
counted because of its contingent nature. However, it should not be if
it is valued on the day of the merger, as the appraisal law requires.
The contingent aspect is moot at that point; the contingent event has
occurred.
So, if the agreement should have added value to the majority share-
holder's interest pre-merger, it also should have added value to the
minority interest pre-merger. It should not be dispositive that the mi-
nority stockholders were not to share in the post-merger company,
and both Weinberger and Cede teach that it is not dispositive. Wein-
berger's comments on future value assume that the minority share-
110. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
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holders were not going to share in this value. The issue of future value
is only relevant if the minority stockholders have been cashed-out in
the merger. Therefore, under Weinberger it is not dispositive that the
minority shareholders were not intended to share in the post-merger
company. Similarly, Cede included the value of Perelman's planned
transactions even though they were executed post-merger."' His pre-
merger plans are analogous to the pre-merger concessions agreement,
and the post-merger completion of the Technicolor transactions are
analogous to the post-merger concessions to Midway. Therefore, also
under Cede it is not dispositive that the minority stockholders were
not intended to share in the post-merger company. So, even under the
Allenson court's own added value test, the other result should have
been reached.
C. Nature of the Enterprise Cases
The Allenson court failed to distinguish Cede as a "nature of the
enterprise" case and Allenson as not. Again, Weinberger said that
"[non-speculative] elements of future value, including the nature of the
enterprise, may [and should] be considered." 112 The phrase "including
the nature of the enterprise" seems to indicate that the nature of the
enterprise is only one type of future value that should be considered.
In Cede, the court recognized that the Perelman plan changed the
"nature of the enterprise" and became the "operative reality" of the
company. 113 Since the Cede opinion dealt with an instance of "nature
of the enterprise" value, it should be read cautiously with respect to
other types of value.
The cost concessions in Allenson seem like another type of value.
They are more like more discreet elements of value. This article ar-
gued above that the concessions agreement and its execution are anal-
ogous to the Perelman plan and its execution. They are similar
because the initial agreement and the Perelman plan both added lim-
ited value before the merger by laying a foundation for their execu-
tion after the merger. But they are also different. The Perelman plan
was a business plan for radically changing the fundamental nature of
the enterprise. The cost concessions, although part of a major overall
restructuring, did not change the fundamental nature of the enterprise
per se. Rather, they were very discreet elements of value, not nearly as
wide-ranging in scope.
111. See Cede, 684 A.2d at 296.
112. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
113. See Cede, 684 A.2d at 293.
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Maybe the inclusion- of "nature of the enterprise" value in appraisal
should hinge on whether the majority acquiror has unilateral power to
change the nature of the enterprise, as Cede suggests and Allenson
requires. The unilateral power requirement might make sense for "na-
ture of the enterprise" value because such a broad directional change
might not be the "operative reality" of the company without clear au-
thority to effect the change. For example, Perelman's plan for the
company probably would have been speculative without authority for
him to effect his plan. While this theory is plausible, it is still
debatable.
On the other hand, the unilateral power requirement might be too
strict a standard for merely ensuring that a change in the nature of an
enterprise has a proper basis in reality. For example, a merger agree-
ment that agrees to change the nature of the enterprise seems to sat-
isfy the need for a basis in reality, even if it would not provide for any
unilateral authority to begin implementing those changes pre-merger.
How this type of arrangement should be handled is not clear from
Cede, but Allenson suggests such value should not be included.
Regardless, even if "unilateral power" should be a requirement for
all "nature of the enterprise" cases, such a requirement should not
necessarily be applied to cases like Allenson in which future value
does not depend on a fundamental change in the nature of the enter-
prise. The cost concessions are discreet elements of value. Unlike a
strategic plan to change the nature of the enterprise, the concessions
are not in jeopardy of lacking a basis in reality. Unlike Perelman's
plan, they were cemented by a contract. They have a non-speculative
basis in reality. This is all that should be required. It is all that Wein-
berger requires.
VII. A LoosE END: Cavalier Oil
The Delaware Supreme Court's language from Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Harnett,114 discussed in ONTI," 5 on its face appears contrary to the
thesis of this article. It was decided after Weinberger so arguably it
might limit the Weinberger holding. In Cavalier Oil, William Harnett
was cashed-out of a closely held corporation via a short-form
merger. 1 6 He sued for appraisal. 17 One of the main questions that
the court considered was whether his misappropriation of a corporate
opportunity claim could be considered as an element of value in the
114. 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989).
115. ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 909-11 (Del. Ch. 1999).
116. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Del. 1989).
117. Id.
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appraisal process. 118 The court upheld the lower court's determination
that it could be considered in appraisal even though it related to a
breach of a fiduciary duty, a claim that should normally be maintained
in a separate action.119
In its general statements about appraisal law, the Cavalier Oil court
said a company should be valued "without regard to post-merger
events or other possible business combinations.' 20 On its face, this
statement appears to prohibit consideration of the concessions in Al-
lenson. The concessions could be characterized as a "post-merger
event."
Without even questioning the meaning of Cavalier Oil, one possible
rebuttal is that while the actual concessions occurred post-merger in
Allenson, the concessions agreement was signed before the merger.
The signing of the agreement added value to the going concern and
was not a post-merger event.
However, the precise meaning of Cavalier Oil should be questioned.
In light of Weinberger, the Cavalier Oil statement is logical when it is
understood that only "post-merger events" and "subsequent business
combinations" that were speculative at the time of the merger should
be disregarded in appraisal. Not all post-merger events or business
combinations should be disregarded. Weinberger contemplated the in-
clusion of post-merger events. Subject to the non-speculative require-
ment, it expressly includes in appraisal both "elements of value arising
from the completion of the merger" and "future value." Moreover,
Cede involved consideration of post-merger events, the eventual sale
of Technicolor's assets that were non-speculatively contemplated on
the date of the merger. Even Bell v. Kirby Lumber,'2' the case that
the Cavalier Oil court cited for support of its statement, supports this
view.122 It stated:
Thus, market value, asset value, dividends, earning prospects, the
nature of the enterprise and any other facts which were known or
which could be ascertained as of the date of merger and which
throw any light on future prospects of the merged corporation are
not only pertinent to an inquiry as to the value of the dissenting
stockholders' interest, but must be considered by the agency fixing
the value. 123
118. Id. at 1143.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1144.
121. 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
122. Id. at 141.
123. Id.
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Future sales and earnings are post-merger events, and if they are non-
speculative they should be included in appraisal. It seems that only if
the post-mergers events were unknown at the time of the merger or if
their occurrence was a matter of speculation at the time of the merger
should they be disregarded in appraisal. This interpretation of Cava-
lier Oil is consistent with Weinberger, ONTI, and Cede, but not Allen-
son. It suggests the court in Allenson held incorrectly.
VIII. A FINAL ILLUSTRATION FROM Grimes
The facts of Grimes can help illustrate this article's argument. Re-
call that Grimes said a failure to have access to routers makes any
sales forecasts of them speculative. 124 This makes sense, but suppose
the facts of Grimes are changed slightly. Hypothetically, if Vitalink
had access to routers before the NSC tender offer or the cash-out,
then the sales forecasts should be evidence of non-speculative future
value. The company has the product, the market, and a loyal client
base. Grimes suggests that such sales forecasts would not be specula-
tive, all other things being equal.125
Change the facts of Grimes once again. Suppose the access to rout-
ers came from a one-step merger agreement with NSC that cashed-out
a minority shareholder and some sales forecasts were created on this
basis between the signing of the merger agreement and its effective
date. The Allenson decision seems to suggest that if access to the rout-
ers came through a merger agreement rather than an independent
OEM contract it would determine whether the forecasts would be in-
cluded in an appraisal value. This approach hardly seems fair to the
minority shareholder or consistent with Weinberger. Sales forecasts of
NSC supplied routers would be evidence of non-speculative future
value arising from the completion of the merger. This fits squarely
within Weinberger. Even though this hypothetical merger agreement
would exclude minority shareholders from participating in the bene-
fits of the future router sales by cashing them out, it does not mean
that value is not already part of their shares by virtue of the merger
agreement and the plan to sell routers.
Furthermore, this last hypothetical might present a "nature of the
enterprise" scenario. Substituting routers for bridges may change the
nature of the enterprise. If it does, should one party be required to
have the unilateral power to implement this change for it to be includ-
able in the appraisal value, as Allenson would require? As the hypo-
124. Grimes v. Vitalink Communications. Corp., 1997 WL 538676 at *6 (Del. Ch. 1997).
125. See id.
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thetical is proposed, neither party has this power. One or both parties
may begin to prepare for the sale of routers in the interim between the
date that the merger agreement is signed and the date that the merger
becomes effective, but neither can implement it unilaterally. But, this
should not matter. On the date of the merger the value is non-specula-
tive, and because it is arising out of the completion of the merger it
should be included in the fair price under Weinberger.
IX. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that Allenson was not properly decided in
light of Weinberger and Cede. Three things were wrong with the
court's reasoning in Allenson. First, the Allenson court did not apply
the Weinberger holding, but instead seemed to apply the proximate
cause exception. The proximate cause exception is inconsistent with
Weinberger, and the plain language of Weinberger suggests a different
outcome in Allenson.
Second, the Allenson court misunderstood or misapplied the phrase
"value added" in Cede. It is more likely that the phrase "value added"
was used only to focus the chancery court on determining how much
value to attribute to a given element of future value, rather than as a
test to determine whether to consider future value as understood by
the Allenson court. However, even if "value added" were the test, the
court seems to have misapplied it. The concessions agreement should
have added value to Midway before the merger. By its ruling the Al-
lenson court suggested that somehow Midway was not more valuable
with the agreement than without it merely because it was contingent.
The agreement should at least have added value to the majority share-
holder's interest. And, if the agreement by itself should have added
value to the majority shareholder's interest pre-merger, it also should
have added value to the minority interest pre-merger. Cede and Wein-
berger both support the idea that merely being cashed-out at the time
of the merger is not dispositive of the question of whether the cashed-
out shareholders deserve a share of non-speculative post-merger
value.
Third, the Allenson court failed to distinguish Cede as a "nature of
the enterprise" case and Allenson as not. "Nature of the enterprise"
value is only one type of future value that should be considered. The
cost concessions in Allenson do not seem like the "nature of the enter-
prise" type of value. Rather, the cost concessions seem like more dis-
creet elements of value. While the unilateral power requirement might
ensure that broad directional changes are the "operative reality" for
"nature of the enterprise" cases, such a requirement should not be
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applied when future value does not depend on a fundamental change
in the nature of the enterprise. Allenson is this type of case. The cost
concessions are not in jeopardy of lacking a basis in reality. Therefore,
the nature of the enterprise reasoning should not be applied to them.
They already have a non-speculative basis in reality. For all three of
these reasons, Allenson was not properly decided.
